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Abstract 
For Christians, the Bible represents a unique document that contains holy messaging about 
how they should live their life. However, the connection between biblical messages and 
personal policy preferences is unclear. This research utilizes a unique survey-embedded 
experiment to discover how a liberal Bible message can impact personal policy preferences. 
Ultimately, I conclude that exposure to a liberal Bible message does not show more liberal 
differences in policy perspectives relative to a control passage amongst Christians. Similarly, 
I also conclude that Christians exposed to a liberal Bible message do not demonstrate 
statistically more liberal policy preferences relative to Christians exposed to a control 
passage across a spectrum of religiosity and political involvement.  
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Introduction 
In terms of the most influential piece of literature in the world, particularly in regard to 
Western society, the Christian Bible stands out dramatically. The Guinness World Records 
identifies the Bible as the best-selling book of all time, while a YouGov poll conducted in 
2014 identified the Bible as the most influential book of all time (Best Selling Book; Wyatt 
2014). It is undeniable that the Bible and Christianity have a tremendous impact on the 
culture of the world, particularly in the United States, as over 70 percent of Americans use 
some form of the Bible as their holy book (Religious Landscape Study). Therefore, we 
should expect that Christianity and the Bible are so integrated into American society that the 
messages and themes present in Christianity find themselves in supposedly secular 
institutions, including the U.S. government and the political realm. Additionally, while not as 
prevalent as previous times in history, around 30 percent of Americans take the Bible as the 
inerrant word of God, meaning that they believe in biblical literalism (Religious Landscape 
Study). The word of God is a powerful authority to believers, particularly in lieu of more 
active forms of communication, even if they do not believe that every element in the Bible 
should be taken literally. Therefore, it is important to understand how the Bible integrates 
into other elements of people’s lives, namely, political policy preferences. Given the 
potential for political decisions to impact the lives of citizens, it is important to understand 
individual’s policy preferences, since, in the aggregate, it can affect their own and their 
communities’ livelihoods. This project explores the extent to which the Bible can shape 
policy preferences. Ultimately, understanding the politics of a group requires understanding 
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their culture, and American politics simply cannot be told without coming to an 
understanding of the role of religion within American Politics.  
Review of Literature 
Public Opinion Development ​Public opinion has long been a subject of examination within 
political science, particularly in how people come to hold their beliefs. In examining the 
process by which people’s policy preferences are changed, how people form said preferences 
in the first place is an important component. In Converse’s (1964) magnum opus, “The 
Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” he argued against the thesis that people use 
complicated ideological systems in determining political beliefs; rather, very few people are 
true ideologues, and the plurality of people hold opinions based off their ideas on whether the 
stance helps or hurts a group to which they belong. It is important to note a component of 
these groups can include religion.  
In 1992, Zaller asserted that through the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) Model, 
people take cues from elites who disseminate policy stances, and depending on individual’s 
level of partisanship and interest in politics, such policy cues are taken differently (Markus 
1994). In Zaller’s (1992) RAS model, the higher the level of attention, the quicker the 
individual will react to changes in elite discourse, while the higher the level of partisanship, 
the better the individual will filter out information that doesn’t fit with their existing partisan 
biases. This is very similar to Festinger’s (1957) conception of cognitive dissonance – when 
people encounter new information that is contrary to existing beliefs, it creates a sensation of 
discomfort, and they will work to reduce said discomfort by attempting to work the new 
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information into their beliefs or by negatively reacting or attacking the legitimacy of the new 
information (Lashley 2009). However, Zaller’s (1992) model shows how elites play a pivotal 
role in forming public opinion through distributing the new information (Markus 1994). 
 In more recent research, scholars proposed a cascading model where elites frame an 
issue and modify the frame based on the public reaction (Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Entman 2004). In contrast, Druckman (2001) suggests that the public does not  implicitly 
trust all elites – instead, the public only listens to elites that they trust. Further, when 
discussing how public opinion is changed, Payne (2001) and Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 
(1997) note that successful framing relies upon relating the issue at hand to something the 
framer already knows the recipient of the frame agrees or disagrees with contingent upon the 
desired outcome.  Hetherington (2014) posits that framing is a process of building off other 
already held frames rather than generalizing existing frames to fit the present need – the 
process makes things more complex rather than an attempt at simplification. However, there 
is currently a literal gap on whether texts, particularly spiritual texts, can serve as a form of 
elites in which people receive their cues for public opinion, as the current literature focuses 
on human elites, such as politicians, journalists, etc. (Zaller 1992). 
Party Identification ​An important component of knowing someone’s political policy 
preferences is party identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Gerber, Huber, and Washington 
2010). Jennings and Niemi (1974) establish that party identification is highly influenced by 
parental party identification at a unintentional level, meaning that parents do not intend to 
influence their children’s party affiliation, but still retain influence through indirect actions. 
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Jennings and Niemi (1974) and Campbell et al. (1960) also establish that party identification 
is a relatively permanent lens through which people examine politics.  
However, the concept of stable partisan identification has evolved to allow for more 
flexibility  – Key (1966) and Downs (1957) argue that partisan attachment is more fluid and 
affected by events in people’s lives, particularly among those who do not identify as strong 
partisans. Downs’ (1957) and Key’s (1966) views have been reinforced by modern 
scholarship, as Tucker, Montgomery, and Smith (2018) argue that partisanship changes at an 
individual level over time, primarily in relation to their current view on the political parties 
and the president. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) argue that variation in partisan 
identification over time is primarily due to researchers not accounting for random survey 
response variation over time. Meanwhile, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) posit that 
in the aggregate, partisanship changes as a function of the economy. Hershey (2017) notes 
that other institutions influence early partisan attachments; in particular, religion and formal 
education can influence party affiliation, though schools try to be nonpartisan. Additionally, 
religion rarely enforces partisan beliefs that are not backed by the parents of the individual, 
causing a potential endogeneity issue (Hershey 2017).  
The Rise and Fall of Biblical Literalism​ In the larger scale of religious history, biblical 
literalism, the belief that the Bible is the inerrant word of God, is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Biblical literalism emerged largely as a reaction to modernity and the rise of 
science and industrialization in the late 19​th​ century (Armstrong 2001). In essence, as 
scientific discovery and rationalism became seen as the primary way to obtain knowledge 
regarding the world, religious figures feared that the Bible would be seen as untrue or false 
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by scientific standards, and thus they reacted by claiming that the Bible was scientifically and 
literally true – every event described was interpreted as factually correct (Armstrong 2001). 
Previous methods of interpreting the Bible in a metaphorical manner largely fell out of use, 
particularly in Evangelical Christian communities (Armstrong 2001).  
Since 1964, The American National Election Studies (ANES) has conducted survey 
research on the American population on the subject of biblical literalism through the use of 
two different questions, the first used from 1964-1990, while the second was used from 
1990-2016 (American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File; Leege, Kellstedt, and 
Wald 1990). From 1964 until 1990, belief in biblical literalism was around 50 percent. Since 
then, biblical literalism has dropped into the low 30’s in 2016, though it is unclear how much 
of the variation between the years is due to question wording and changes in provided answer 
choices (American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File). The 1964-1990 measure 
stated, “Here are four statements about the Bible and I'd like you to tell me which is closest 
to your own view,” with the following options: “The Bible is the Word of God and all it says 
is true,” “The Bible was written by men but inspired by God, but contains some human 
errors,” “The Bible is a good book because it was written by wise men, but God had nothing 
to do with it,” “The Bible was written by men who lived so long ago that it is worth very 
little today," and an “other, specify” category (American National Election Studies 
Cumulative Data File; Leege, Kellstedt, and Wald 1990 35). The measure used in the 
1990-2016 ANES stated the following, “Which of these statements come closest to 
describing your feelings about the Bible?” with the following answer choices: “the Bible is 
the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word," “The Bible is the word of 
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God but not everything in it should be taken literally word for word," "The Bible is a book 
written by men and is not the word of God," and the “other, don’t know” category; as seen 
here, the wording of the questions significantly changed and the 1990-2016 option offered 
one less option than the 1964-1990 option (American National Election Studies Cumulative 
Data File; Leege, Kellstedt, and Wald 1990 35). The change in question wording from 1990 
to the present is largely due to the recommendations of Leege, Kellstedt, and Wald (1990) in 
their report on the NES. From 1964 to 1990, the belief in biblical literalism oscillated around 
50 percent support, reaching a relative high in 1968 followed by a relative drop in 1980 to 
just above 45 percent, though slightly ticking back up towards 50 percent until 1990 
(American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File). Meanwhile the measure that 
started use in 1990 recorded an initial level of support for biblical literalism at 45 percent - 
following 1990, there was a relatively steady decline in the belief in biblical literalism until 
the low point in 2016 with just above 30 percent support (American National Election 
Studies Cumulative Data File).  
One potential explanation for the decline in biblical literalism is the decline in 
religious beliefs overall. Brauer (2018) argues that the decline in religion in the United States 
is largely a generational trend because younger people are less religious overall than older 
generations, while others (Hout and Fischer 2014; Putnam and Campbell 2012; Butler, 
Wacker, and Balmer 2008; Hout 2016) point to the politics and actions of right-wing, 
religious groups and the Catholic Church, which are the cause behind the overall change in 
American religion, primarily through people viewing their actions as distasteful. Stroope 
(2011) directly points out that higher levels of education reduced the likelihood of 
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individuals to believe in biblical literalism, thus explaining why belief in biblical literalism is 
on the decline while education rates rise, culminating in 2018 with the United States Census 
Bureau releasing an article entitled, “U.S. Population More Educated Than Ever Before,” 
(Schmidt 2018). In 2017, Gallup polls recorded that only 24 percent of Americans believe the 
Bible is the literal word of God and meant to be taken word-for-word, while in 2019, Pew 
found that 31 percent maintain beliefs in biblical literalism (Saad 2017; Fahmy 2019).  
Conservatism and Evangelicalism ​According to public opinion data, 85 percent of 
conservatives today identify as Christian, while 52 percent of liberals identify as such 
(Religious Landscape Study). The presidential election cycle of 1980 was one of the first 
national attempts by the Republican Party to use religious messages, as Ronald Reagan 
frequently invoked Matthew 5’s passage about the shining city on a hill - “Y​ou are the light 
of the world. A town built on a hill cannot be hidden” - to simultaneously channel American 
exceptionalism and religious rhetoric ​(Matthew 5:14; Silk 2010 34-35). Williams (2010) 
points to an earlier date for the evangelical association with the Republican Party, arguing 
that the Democrats’ willingness to nominate a Catholic presidential candidate in 1920 laid 
the foundation for evangelical Democrats to leave the Party in the 1940-60’s over civil rights 
and biblical literalism, resulting in an alliance with the Republican Party (Krabbendam 
2011). In the 1970’s, evangelicals, such as Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority movement, 
began to gain power within the Republican party, resulting in the election of Ronald Reagan 
in 1980 on a platform largely influenced by evangelicals advocating for “Judeo-Christian 
values” (Williams 2010; Silk 2010 34). Changing the focus from a historical analysis, Djupe 
and Calfano (2013) concluded that modern Republican politicians will use coded religious 
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messages, such as a hymn or a parable, to get support from evangelicals, as well as using 
religious rhetoric in general to unite the Republican Party (O’Connell 2015). From a 
theoretical standpoint, Belcher, Fandetti, and Cole (2004) concluded that evangelicalism is 
incompatible with the liberal social welfare state, primarily due to evangelical’s insistence on 
the sinful nature of humanity as a reason to deny individual rights that are advocated for by 
modern liberalism, thus pigeonholing evangelicals with conservatism. In essence, there is 
substantial history and philosophy linking conservatism and the Republican Party to 
evangelicals; however, there is a lack of scholarship on liberal elements of Christianity as 
well as potential liberal uses of the Bible in politics.  
“Doing” Religion ​Defining religion is not an easy task nor is it the focus of this paper. 
However, it is important to provide some clarity on what is meant by religion, particularly in 
relation to what it means to be an evangelical Christian. Within the realm of political science, 
religion is often thought of as simply an identity (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; 
Hershey 2017; Williams 2010). However, sociologists often go beyond simply defining 
religion as an identity through arguing it is also an action. Smith et al. (1998) argue that 
religion serves as an identity that causes actions, i.e., because you identify as a member of a 
religious group, you take part in certain actions, while Avishai (2008) argues that the actions 
shape identity in becoming more in line with the expectations of said religion (e.g. someone 
volunteers at the homeless shelter because they think it is the Christian thing to do). 
Regardless of the relationship of which comes first sequentially, it is important to keep in 
mind that action(s) are a major part of religion. In particular, Kelly (2014) notes the 
importance of taking actions thought to be in line with God’s will among evangelical 
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Christians. Further, Kelly (2014) points out that the actions evangelical Christians take 
strengthens their identity, while their identity shapes the actions that they carry out; in other 
words, evangelical identity and the actions they take are “mutually reinforcing” (419).  
The Church and Politics ​Despite the notion of the separation of church and state, 
researchers have long been interested in the role of religion in politics, as well as vice versa. 
In the landmark work ​The Impact of Churches on Political Behavior: An Empirical Study, 
Gilbert (1993) concluded through conducting over 2,100 interviews at over 173 Christian 
churches that the institution of the church itself has an impact on churchgoer’s voting 
preferences and members of church communities impact how other people vote (Davis 
1995). One area with significant research in American politics and religion is the role of the 
clergy in communicating political messages. Paul Djupe and Christopher Gilbert (2003) 
conclude that Lutheran, Episcopal, and majority minority congregations’ clergy sometimes 
take on politically prophetic roles; that is, churches whose denomination make up a small 
percentage of the local community take on more of a politically active role in advocating for 
a seat at the table for political decisions (Crawford 2004). Djupe and Calfano (2013) 
concluded through the use of experiments that clergy can influence their congregation on 
environmental issues when stating their opinion and how they came to their decision 
religiously; additionally, clergy can have an impact on their congregation’s opinion on 
foreign interventions (O’Connell 2015). Recently, through the use of a survey-embedded 
experiment, Wallsten and Nteta (2016) concluded that pastor discourse was able to change 
congregational opinion on immigration among Methodists, Southern Baptists, and 
Evangelical Lutherans. Within their experiment, Wallsten and Nteta (2016) included Bible 
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passages within their treatments of what the pastors said – this muddles their conclusion a bit, 
as it is unclear whether the Bible verse is causing the opinion shift or the rest of the pastor’s 
message. Essentially, there is a potential observational equivalence problem: the pastor’s 
rhetoric could cause the change in people’s opinions, or it could be the Bible passage the 
pastor included in the speech, or the combination of an accepted authority figure citing an 
accepted source. Therefore, there is a gap in the current literature relative to isolating the 
exact role of the Bible. 
The Role of the Religious Community​ ​in Politics ​Political scientists are not only interested 
in religious individuals, but the role religious communities play in politics. Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) identify religious institutions in America as serving a 
mobilization role that is usually reserved for labor unions in European countries; as such, the 
more conservative nature of religious institutions affects the type of voices heard by 
politicians. Additionally, churches can serve as a training ground to acquire political skills, to 
meet people who are involved politically, as well as an opportunity for leaders to motivate 
political activity; this is especially the case for children raised in the church, as it increases 
the likelihood of exposure to said political factors (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Additionally, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) find that among adults, requests for 
political activity are more likely to occur in church than any other supposed non-political 
institution. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) find that church-goers will defer to 
their denomination’s preferred presidential candidate when they dislike both candidates or 
like their denomination’s preferred candidate over the other candidate in a general election. 
Additionally, if the religious person likes both candidates, they are slightly more likely to 
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defer to their denomination’s preferred candidate, while if they disagree with their 
denomination’s nominee but like the other nominee, 21 percent will still vote for their 
denomination’s candidate (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954 225-227). Further, 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) found that less politically involved Catholics 
deferred to their groups’ opinion on political matters, meaning the more politically 
sophisticated a Catholic is, the less of an effect their religion has on their brand of politics. 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) also found that the longer and the greater level of 
involvement a person has with their church, regardless of denomination, the stronger they 
move to their church’s preferred political party, which is reflected in their vote choice. 
As the literature review shows, there is a fair amount of research on religion in 
politics; however, it is by no means comprehensive. Largely, most of the research focuses on 
the impact of the clergy on the congregation –similar research on Biblical interpretation in 
political science is nonexistent, nor is there a great deal of research on the congregation 
members themselves. Therefore, this research project will examine how people handle a 
liberal Bible passage in regard to social policy preferences. This project will also serve as a 
test of the extent of biblical literalism in regards to politics. Prior research reflects that the 
more religious a person is, the more they vote for the interest of their religion (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Meanwhile, as people become more organically involved in 
politics outside the church, the less influence the church has on their vote (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). However, this research is over 70 years old – it is important 
to test their findings to see how the most religious and the most politically involved compare 
to their less involved compatriots.  
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Theory 
As established in the literature review, it is clear than elites play an important role in 
opinion formation and maintenance, but it is unclear as to the extent of who or what can 
qualify as an “elite,” as the literature is limited to evaluating specific people (Zaller 1992; 
Chong and Druckman 2004; Druckman 2001). Wallsten and Nteta’s (2016) 
survey-embedded experiment regarding the influence of clergy rhetoric included specific 
references to the Bible, but it is unclear what role the Bible specifically played in shaping 
people’s policy preferences. Therefore, in expanding on the work regarding the influence of 
elites in opinion formation, this paper explores if a non-anthropological unit can act as elites 
that form public opinion. This forms the basis of Hypothesis 1a and 1b, which is stated 
below:  
Hypothesis 1a: ​When Christians are exposed to a biblical text with a liberal political 
message, their opinion will be more liberal relative to Christians who are not exposed to a 
biblical text.  
Hypothesis 1b:​ When Evangelicals are exposed to a biblical text with a liberal 
political message, their opinion will be more liberal than Evangelicals who are not exposed 
to a biblical text. 
When Christians are exposed to said biblical text, the primed information will cause 
cognitive dissonance in people with opposite political beliefs relative to the message in the 
Bible, as described in Festinger (1957) and Lashley (2009). Similarly, I expect that 
Evangelical Christians who receive the text will respond more in the direction of the political 
message than those who do not receive the text,  though not to the same extent as regular 
Christians since Evangelicals are more conservative on average. People who already agree 
with the text will be further encouraged to express their opinion more strongly than without 
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the primed information. When Christians experience cognitive dissonance, that is, their 
political beliefs disagree with their religious beliefs, they will naturally look to reduce and 
mitigate said dissonance as much as possible – in this instance, I expect people to reduce the 
dissonance in the direction of the biblical information. This is based on the expectation that 
in Christians’ recognition of the Bible as foundational to their identity. Religion, particularly 
for Christians and especially Evangelical Christians, is something actively done rather than a 
one-time event (Kelly 2014; Avishai 2008; Smith et al. 1998), for the religious practice must 
be maintained to receive the end incentive – therefore, I expect Christians and evangelical 
Christians to a lesser extent to attempt to structure their survey responses in such a way to 
maintain consistency with their religious doctrine to achieve their end goal of heaven. 
Further, working under the assumption that the Bible can serve as an elite message, it 
remains unclear whether the conceptualization of the Bible or the message itself that serves 
as the cue. Djupe and Calfano (2013) established the importance of the messenger, as this 
also plays a role. However, it is unclear if the message itself serves as the cue, or the idea that 
the message comes from the Bible, a form of higher authority. I intend to test this through 
Hypothesis 2, which is posited below:  
Hypothesis 2:​ When Christians are exposed to a biblical text with a liberal political 
message, their opinion will be more liberal relative to Christians who are exposed to the same 
text but not described as from the Bible. 
This is due to the expectation that the Bible serves as a cue for Christians, as 
elaborated above, and said cue will provide greater attention to the message of the passage 
than without the biblical cue. This is in line with Kelly’s (2014) work that Christians 
constantly work to be more in line with the conception of what an ideal Christian person 
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would do. This will also test the earlier theory that the Bible itself serves as the cue – 
Christians will regard the message without the Bible identifier as just political in nature, thus 
not paying attention as much as a message with a dual religious and political meaning. This 
also assumes a lack of biblical literacy among the general population of Christians that they 
will not be able to identify the Bible passage as such without the Bible label. Essentially, 
while the message will be important to the overall reaction, I posit that the bible label matters 
as well in acting as an elite authority.  
Based on Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), I explore several important 
hypotheses. First, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) imply a hierarchy of identity – 
some people view religion as a more important identity, while others view political affiliation 
as a more important identity. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) establish that as a 
person becomes more religious, the religious denomination has a greater influence over their 
political opinions; therefore, I hypothesize the following:  
 Hypothesis 3a: ​When exposed to a biblical text with a political message, more 
religious people will be more in line with the political leanings of the text relative to 
less religious people. 
 Hypothesis 3b: ​When exposed to a biblical text with a political message, more 
religious Christians will be more in line with the political leanings of the text relative 
to less religious non-Christians.  
This is primarily due to the expectation that people who are more religious will be more 
inclined to follow biblical doctrines as close as possible – people will then shift their political 
opinions to match their religious beliefs. For people who are extremely religious, their 
religious identity serves as something that must be constantly maintained. I define religiosity 
in terms of the dedication and amount of time the respondent spends in conducting or 
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participating in a religious act. Therefore, we would expect people with large amounts of 
dedication to their religion to work into their maintenance process an “update” of other 
identities, including political identities, to match the new religious information. This fits with 
Zaller’s (1992) RAS model and Festinger’s (1957) model of cognitive dissonance - people 
will work to reduce cognitive dissonance in processing the new information given via the 
vignette treatment. Hypothesis 3b works as a natural extension of Hypothesis 3a: I expect 
greater alignment amongst Christians due to using a Christian text. Similarly, Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) provide evidence that as people become more politically 
sophisticated, they will experience less influence from their religious affiliation; this forms 
the basis of my fourth and final hypothesis, which is shown below:  
Hypothesis 4: ​When a person is exposed to biblical text with a political message, the more 
politically sophisticated individuals will be less in line with the text than those who are less 
politically sophisticated.  
This serves as the inverse of the previous hypothesis – instead of the religious identity 
serving as the guiding framework, the political identity of the individual serves as the 
overarching umbrella identity. Therefore, when new political information is exposed to the 
politically sophisticated, the fact the information is also religious in nature will be of little 
consequence, as what matters is whether the idea fits into their overarching political identity 
in the first place.  
Research Design 
For this project, I build off the work done by Wallsten and Nteta (2016) in the use of 
a survey-embedded experiment. The survey-embedded experient model will combine the 
classic internal validity of a regular experiment with the external validity of a traditional 
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experiment, thus adding to the overall quality of the research project. The specific text of the 
survey can be found in Appendix A of this document. In terms of administration of the 
survey, I used the platform Qualtrics to administer the survey online. All survey questions are 
either taken from Pew’s Religious Landscape survey, the 2016 American National Election 
Studies Time Series Study, Qualtrics suggested demographic questions, questions from my 
prior academic work in consultation with Dr. Newmark, or original questions - each 
questions’ origin is noted in the Appendix. Some questions’ wording and responses were 
slightly modified to better capture certain beliefs of the respondent. The survey was 
administered to a convenience sample of undergraduate students at Appalachian State 
University in the spring semester of 2020. Invitations to take the survey were sent out via 
email from participating professors. Depending on the professor, extra credit was offered 
upon completion of the survey. Four hundred and forty-eight students at least partially 
completed the survey with 380 fully complete responses.  
Ten professors at Appalachian State University agreed to send out the survey to their 
students via email - the respondents came from political science, religious studies, 
philosophy, or geology courses. At the beginning of the survey, the respondents were 
informed that I am a researcher from Appalachian State University, that the survey is about 
the interaction of various demographic groups, religion, pop culture, and politics, how all 
responses are completely confidential, and to please select the best answer choice that 
describes themselves. Additionally, there was a brief paragraph describing how students can 
receive extra credit in their classes for completing the survey. The first question dealt with 
their religious identification. If the participant answers as “Protestant,” they will receive a 
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follow-up question asking if they consider themselves Evangelical. Next, a short text was 
shown that says the next section discusses religious practice and beliefs and tells them to 
select the answer that best represents their actions or beliefs. This set of questions dealt with 
matters such as if they consider themselves a born-again Christian and how often they attend 
religious services. Additionally, I asked a question about biblical literalism. This subset of 
questions is randomized to eliminate question ordering effects. Following the questions on 
religiosity, I gave the respondents a short block of text that tells them the next question is 
about political involvement, and that they should select the answer that best represents their 
actions or beliefs. I then asked a quick matrix-style question regarding their level of political 
involvement. Next, I administered the experimental component of the survey; in this 
instance, a short bit of directions were provided to tell the respondent to carefully read the 
passage and where it comes from is specified in the first sentence. Respondents were given 
one of three excerpts. The first excerpt states the following: “The following passages are 
from the Bible. James 2:14-17: ‘What good is it, my brothers, if someone says he has faith 
but does not have works? Can that faith save him? If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and 
lacking in daily food, and one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, be warm and filled,’ 
without giving them the things needed for the body, what good is that? So also faith by itself, 
if it does not have works, is dead.’ Luke 3:11: ‘Anyone who has two shirts should share with 
the one who has none, and anyone who has food should do the same.’” The first excerpt 
contains two English Standard Version (ESV) Bible verses with a liberal message that relates 
to taking care of the poor and wealth inequality. The second excerpt is the following: “The 
following passages are local sayings. What good is it, my brothers, if someone says he has 
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faith but does not have works? Can that faith save him? If a brother or sister is poorly clothed 
and lacking in daily food, and one of you says to them, “Go in peace, be warm and filled,” 
without giving them the things needed for the body, what good is that? So also faith by itself, 
if it does not have works, is dead. Anyone who has two shirts should share with the one who 
has none, and anyone who has food should do the same.” The second excerpt is the exact 
same text as the first excerpt, but it classifies the passage as a local saying instead and does 
not include where the passages came from in the Bible. Finally, for a control, the third 
excerpt serves as a control and is a passage from a CNN story regarding cell phone-related 
injuries (please refer to the Appendix for exact wording).  
To add a distractor, respondents were then asked to watch a short video from 
America’s Funniest Home Videos on “Hilarious Birthday Fails,” followed by two quick 
questions regarding the video. The distractor largely helps to avoid measurement error in 
overestimating the effect of the treatment by directly asking policy preferences after the 
treatment. In particular, this was also done to avoid structuring answers by people in the 
Bible passage treatment, as it could be too obvious to the respondent that we were looking to 
measure the effect of the Bible on political preferences.  
Next, respondents were given instructions that the following set of questions deals 
with political policy preferences. The participants were asked in a randomized order a set of 
eight social policy preferences questions. The subjects of these questions concerned the 
minimum wage, government spending on healthcare for the poor, income inequality, 
affirmative action, federal spending on welfare, federal spending on aid to the poor, paid 
parental leave, and immigration policy. Finally, the last set of survey questions collected 
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demographic information.  I included a question concerning the year of birth taken from the 
Qualtrics generic demographic survey question database. The validity of the questions asked 
throughout the survey should be relatively high, given their use by other polling 
organizations and that I am using them to measure the same outcomes, just on different 
populations, using a different method. 
In order to clearly articulate my independent variables, I created an operationalization 
table via Table 1. Table 1 lists the concept, what question applies to the concept, and how the 
concept is coded. For specific question wording, please reference the Appendix. For this 
project, my dependent variables are all related to specific policy questions. To determine if 
the set of items are related to one another, I calculated a Cronbach’s alpha score. The 
questions display a relatively high Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.87, indicating that they 
explore relatively similar moods regarding public policy. However, I evaluate each item 
individually to capture a larger degree of uniqueness per question area, as it would be 
interesting to explore where my hypotheses are particularly applicable. All dependent 
variables are coded so that higher numerical values indicate more liberal stances and ask the 
respondent on their relative stance on the subject mentioned. Dependent variables are 
displayed in Table 2 below. For particular question wording, please refer to the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Hughes 21 
 
Table 1. Operationalization of Concepts for Independent Variables 
Name of Concept Definition of Concept Applicable Question(s) Coding of Concept 
Vignette Refers to a short block 
of text given to 
respondent. 3 options: 
Bible passage, local 
saying, or control. 
“vignette” variable 0: Control vignette 
1: Local Saying vignette  
2: Bible Vignette 
Religious Identification  Refers to the religious 
identity of the 
respondent 
Q2: religious 
identification 
1-7 scale. Nominal 
variable.  
Evangelical Identity Refers to whether the 
respondent identifies as 
an Evangelical.  
Q53: Evangelical 
identity 
1-2 scale. Dummy 
variable. 1 is 
Evangelical, 2 is not 
Religiosity  The extent of how 
important religion is to 
the daily life of the 
respondent 
Q6 (religious service 
attendance)  
Q9 (Biblical literalism) 
Q14 (discussion of faith 
with non-believers) 
Q12 (how often they 
read scripture)  
Q11 (how often they 
pray) 
Q67 (discussion of faith 
with believers) 
 
1. Index of Q6, Q14, 
Q12, Q11, and Q67. 
Scored 0-23. 0-7 low 
religiosity, 8-15 medium 
religiosity, 16-23 high 
religiosity.  
 
2. Q9 0-3, lower 
numbers indicate less 
religious answer  
Political Involvement The extent to which the 
respondent engages in 
the political realm 
Q69_1 (protest 
attendance) 
Q69_2 (signed a 
petition) 
Q69_3 (worked for a 
campaign) 
Q69_4 (political post on 
social media) 
Index of Q69_1, Q69_2, 
Q69_3, Q69_4. Scored 
0-4. 0-1 low political 
involvement, 2 medium 
political involvement, 
3-4 high political 
involvement. 
Ideology Belief system used to 
assess how the world 
should be in terms of 
political and policy 
outcomes 
Q43 (Ideology sliding 
scale) 
1-7 scale. 1, 2, 3 coded 
as liberal, 4 as moderate, 
5, 6, 7, coded as 
conservative. 
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Table 2. Operationalization of Concepts for Dependent Variables 
Name of Variable Classification of Variable Coding of Concept 
Minimum Wage (Q25) Ordinal 0-3 
Government Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance for Those 
Without Insurance (Q26) 
Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
Government Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28) 
Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
Affirmative Action (Q30) Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
Aid to Poor (Q58) Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
Immigration (Q35) Ordinal  0-3 
Welfare Spending (Q31) Ordinal, Likert scale 0-4 
 
After the survey was conducted, I ran several statistical analyses. In particular, I used 
difference of means tests and confidence intervals to compare the responses on the different 
social policy questions to the vignette they received, thus testing whether the vignettes had an 
effect on social policy preferences. I utilized the religiosity index and the biblical literalism 
question  to determine if the Bible passages had a greater impact on the more religious 
subjects relative to those who were less religious. Further, my political involvement matrix 
was used to evaluate how the vignettes affected responses across levels of political 
sophistication.  
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Analysis  
Data were collected from 448 students who at least partially completed the survey 
with 380 fully complete responses. Approximately 31.51 percent of respondents received the 
control vignette, 33.56 percent the local saying vignette, and 34.93 percent received the Bible 
passage vignette. In terms of religious identification, 34.92 percent of respondents identified 
as Protestant, 9.98 percent as Catholic, 2.04 percent as Jewish, 17.91 percent as agnostic, 
10.88 percent as atheist, and 24.26 percent as something else. Non-Christians are included 
within the analysis of this survey when comparing across all responses given. Of people who 
identified as Protestant, 47.71 percent identified as Evangelical. Approximately 52.39 percent 
of respondents were liberal, 17.18 percent moderate, and 30.42 percent conservative. Table 3 
displays the average scores on the policy questions using the mean and also displays the 
standard deviation. 
As seen in Table 3, there was some variation across questions. Paid parental leave 
received highly liberal answers, while affirmative action received relatively less liberal 
responses. The immigration question was also relatively less liberal, though it is important to 
keep in mind that there were fewer answer categories for the immigration question relative to 
the others outside of minimum wage. Overall, however, it appears that the liberal 
overrepresentation carries over to the policy responses and is not limited to 
self-identification.  
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Table 3. Average Score on Policy Questions  
Question Mean Score (Closest Category) Standard Deviation 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 2.64 (Raised) 
(N=382) 
0.61 
Gov’t Spending on Healthcare 
Insurance (Q26) 
2.99 (Slightly increase) 
(N=382) 
1.06 
 
Gov’t Reduction of Income 
Inequality (Q28) 
2.54 (Slightly favor) 
(N=381) 
1.30 
Affirmative Action (Q30) 2.00 (Neither favor nor oppose) 
(N=382) 
1.17 
Aid to Poor (Q58) 2.91 (Slightly increase) 
(N=377) 
0.96 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) 3.63 (Strongly favor) 
(N=376) 
0.70 
Immigration (Q35)  1.86 (Allow to remain if they meet certain 
requirements) 
(N=377) 
0.86 
Welfare Spending (Q31) 2.60 (Slightly increase) 
(N=377) 
1.11 
N=​n​ displays the number of observations for the specified question 
Before I analyzed the data to test my hypotheses,  I checked the relative effects of 
each treatment, as seen in Table 4. Table 4 displays the average score and 95 percent 
confidence interval among all respondents on the policy preference questions. Higher scores 
indicate more liberal policy preferences.  
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Table 4.  Mean Score on Policy Questions by Vignette  
Mean Score Bible Vignette Local Saying 
Vignette 
Control Vignette  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 2.66 
(2.56, 2.77) 
N=133 
 
2.60 
(2.49, 2.71)  
N=127 
2.65 
(2.55, 2.75) 
N=122 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance (Q26) 
 
2.89 
(2.72, 3.07) 
N=133 
 
3.11 
(2.94, 3.29) 
N=127 
2.98 
(2.79, 3.18) 
N=122 
Gov’t Reduction of income 
inequality (Q28)  
 
2.48 
(2.25, 2.70) 
N=132 
 
2.57 
(2.34, 2.79) 
N=127 
2.59 
(2.36, 2.82) 
N=122 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
1.95 
(1.75, 2.15) 
N=133 
 
2.09 
(1.88, 2.29) 
N=127 
1.96 
(1.75, 2.17) 
N=122 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
2.91 
(2.75, 3.07) 
N=132 
 
2.95 
(2.79, 3.11)  
N=124 
2.88 
(2.69, 3.06)  
N=121 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) 
 
3.62 
(3.49, 3.75) 
N=132 
 
3.68 
(3.56, 3.80) 
N=123 
3.59 
(3.47, 3.71) 
N=121 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
1.87 
(1.73, 2.02) 
N=132 
 
1.74 
(1.58, 1.90) 
N=124 
1.97 
(1.82, 2.12) 
N=121 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
  
2.50  
(2.31, 2.69) 
N=132 
 
2.63 
(2.44, 2.82) 
N=124 
2.67 
(2.47, 2.87) 
N=121 
Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. N= represents the 
number of observations in the cell.  
As Table 4 shows, all mean values for each question by vignette lie within the 95 percent 
confidence interval of one another, indicating a lack of uniqueness between vignettes. 
Chi-squared tests of independence confirm that in the aggregate, the treatment vignettes had 
relatively no effect on the preferred policy preferences of the respondents.  
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Table 4’s findings are somewhat expected: only 44.9 percent of the population polled 
identified as Christian, and non-Christians could have been negatively affected by the use of 
a Christian biblical text, thus muting group sentiment in the aggregate; therefore, Table 4’s 
inclusion of non-Christians affects the measurable outcomes. Table 5 provides a more 
specific breakdown by each policy question asked to see if particular questions were more 
affected by the vignettes amongst Christians only, including both Protestants and Roman 
Catholics. This determines the answer to Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b, and Hypothesis 2.  
First, Table 5 serves as a clear rejection of Hypothesis 1, which stated that Christians 
exposed to a liberal Bible passage will respond more liberally  relative to Christians who did 
not receive the liberal bible passage. As seen here, the control vignette and the Bible 
vignette’s mean response always lies within one another’s 95 percent confidence interval. 
Overall, it should be noted that a chi-square test of independence indicates that the vignette 
received and answer given for each policy question was statistically independent. However, 
there appears to be a somewhat noticeable trend that might be affecting the tests of statistical 
significance. As already articulated, the Bible treatment and the control treatment appear 
statistically independent. However, this is not the case in all questions for the local saying 
treatment. Outside of the immigration question, there is a noticeable visual trend when 
reading from right to left: the control mean is followed by a higher local saying mean, then 
the Bible passage vignette mean score declines back to about the mean of the control 
vignette. This appears to be especially the case for questions related directly to government 
spending. 
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Table 5. Mean Score on Policy Questions by Vignette for Christians  
Mean Index Score Bible Vignette Local Saying Vignette Control Vignette  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.49 
(2.31, 2.67) 
 
N=65 
2.56  
(2.42, 2.70) 
 
N=59 
2.52 
(2.34, 2.70) 
 
N=46 
Gov’t Spending on Healthcare 
Insurance (Q26) 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.54* 
(2.27, 2.81) 
 
N=65 
3.05*  
(2.77, 3.33) 
 
N=59 
2.61 
(2.23, 2.99) 
 
N=46 
Gov’t Reduction of Income 
Inequality (Q28)  
 
  Number of Observations 
2.12* 
(1.79, 2.45) 
 
N=65 
2.53* 
(2.17, 2.88) 
 
N=59 
2.04  
(1.62, 2.46) 
 
N=46 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
1.92 
(1.63, 2.21) 
 
N=65 
2.17 
(1.86, 2.48) 
 
N=59 
1.89 
(1.54, 2.24) 
 
N=46  
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.67* 
(2.46, 2.89) 
 
N=64 
2.93* 
(2.70, 3.16) 
 
N=59 
2.65 
(2.33, 2.98) 
 
N=46 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
3.47* 
(3.25, 3.69) 
 
N=64 
3.71* 
(3.56, 3.86) 
 
N=59 
3.50  
(3.30, 3.70) 
 
N=46 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
1.73 
(1.53, 1.94) 
 
N=64 
1.66 
(1.42, 1.90) 
 
N=59 
1.83 
(1.56, 2.09) 
 
N=46 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.14*  
(1.87, 2.41)  
 
N=64 
2.54  
(2.28, 2.81) 
 
N=59 
2.33 
(1.97, 2.68) 
 
N=46 
Note that hypothesis tests are directional. When comparing the control and the local saying vignettes, the 
alternative hypothesis states that the local saying hypothesis average should be higher than the control 
hypothesis, while when comparing the local saying hypothesis to the Bible hypothesis, the alternative 
hypothesis expects that the Bible hypothesis average will be lower than the local saying average. Numbers in 
parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. * in the local saying vignette 
category indicates statistical significance at the p<.10 level between the local saying and control groups. * in the 
Bible vignette category indicates statistical significance at the p<0.10 level between the local saying and Bible 
groups. 
Theoretically, Hypothesis 1a might have been flawed, given the understanding 
posited in the data. Hypothesis 1a worked under the assumption that the passage’s message 
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would impact one’s understanding of the Bible and Christianity, which would in turn impact 
policy preferences. Policy preferences are affected by other factors, but Figure 1 simplifies 
the model below:  
 
However, it appears that the Bible cue itself has its own effect on the policy 
preferences of an individual. However,  this model does not fit the data. Rather, just the cue 
of “the Bible” appears to have a conservative influence over the policy preferences of the 
individual. I refer to this as the dual-variable model. The dual variable model largely explains 
why the chi-squared test of independence would fail to recognize a statistically dependent 
relationship, as there appears to be two variables involved: the passage used itself and the 
Bible cue, and in this case, they mitigate each other: the liberal bible passage’s effect is 
muted by the Bible cue for the people who received the Bible vignette. Therefore, the 
competing variables minimize the effect of one another, and in this instance, cause the Bible 
vignette respondents to resemble the control vignette respondents. First, for the dual variable 
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model to fit, the local saying passage must be statistically significant in a positive manner 
from the control passage - this confirms the effect of the local saying passage, as the local 
saying vignette was more liberal in nature. Next, the local saying passage must be 
statistically significant from the Bible passage: that is, the Bible passage must be smaller and 
statistically significant than the local saying vignette, as the dual variable model projects that 
the Bible cue would exert a conservative pressure on the respondents’ policy preferences.  
Referring back to Table 5,  I reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the control and local saying group in the areas of government spending on 
healthcare insurance, government reducing income inequality, and paid parental leave 
(p<0.05). Further, from the questions specified, I reject the null that there is no difference 
between the average local saying vignette response and the average bible vignette response 
for government spending on healthcare insurance and paid parental leave (p<0.05). 
Government reduction of income inequality is also significantly different at the p<0.10 level. 
Federal spending on welfare also has a statistically significant difference between the local 
saying vignette and the Bible vignette (p<0.05), while government spending on aid to the 
poor is also statistically different at the p<0.10 level. The affirmative action question 
approaches statistical significance at the p<0.10 level but is not quite statistically different 
between the local saying and Bible vignette. Therefore, it appears that in certain 
issue-specific categories, namely government spending on health insurance, government’s 
role in reducing income inequality, and establishing paid parental leave, the dual variable 
model is in play. Additionally, welfare spending and aid to the poor, maintain statistically 
different relationships between the local saying vignette and the Bible passage vignette. From 
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a substantive significance perspective, it should be understood that the differences between 
the vignettes is fairly substantial among the statistically significant relationships. The 
government spending on health insurance question has a half-category difference between 
the mean response between the Bible vignette group and the local saying group. Amongst the 
statistically significant relationships between the local saying and bible passage groups, there 
is a 0.364 average gap, indicating that the bible passage group on average is 36.4 percent of 
one category less liberal. While this is not massive, it is enough to be considered 
substantially different between the local saying and bible passage groups. Similarly, among 
the statistically significant groups between the control and the local saying passage, there is a 
0.38 category gap.  
To further evaluate the dual-variable model specified in earlier, it is important to 
examine sub-groups of Christians, particularly Protestants and Evangelicals, to see if the 
trend is more sect-specific. Table 6 highlights the Protestant average and 95 percent 
confidence interval while Table 7 does the same for solely Evangelicals. Note that the 
Protestant average naturally includes Evangelicals.  
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Table 6.  Mean Score on Policy Questions by Vignette among Protestants  
Mean Index Score Bible Vignette Local Saying Vignette Control Vignette  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.48 
(2.29, 2.67) 
 
N=52 
2.56 
(2.41, 2.70) 
 
N=45 
2.54 
(2.37, 2.71) 
 
N=35 
Gov’t Spending on Healthcare 
Insurance (Q26) 
 
Number of Observations 
2.46* 
(2.16, 2.76) 
 
N=52 
2.89 
(2.55, 3.22) 
 
N=45 
2.54 
(2.10, 2.98) 
 
N=35 
Gov’t Reduction of Income 
Inequality (Q28)  
 
  Number of Observations 
2.23 
(1.88, 2.58) 
 
N=52 
2.31 
(1.89, 2.73) 
 
N=45 
1.97 
(1.50, 2.44) 
 
N= 35 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
1.83 
(1.51, 2.15) 
 
N=52 
2.04 
(1.69, 2.40) 
 
N=45 
1.83 
(1.41, 2.25) 
 
N=35 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.65 
(2.41, 2.89) 
 
N=51 
2.76 
(2.49, 3.02) 
 
N=45 
2.60  
(2.23, 2.97) 
 
N=35 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
3.55 
(3.35, 3.75) 
 
N=51 
3.71* 
(3.55, 3.87) 
 
N=45 
3.49 
(3.25, 3.72) 
 
N=35 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
1.75 
(1.52, 1.97) 
 
N=51 
1.51 
(1.23, 1.79) 
 
N=45 
1.83  
(1.54, 2.12) 
 
N=35 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.12 
(1.83, 2.40) 
 
N=51 
2.33 
(2.03, 2.64) 
 
N=45 
2.26 
(1.86, 2.66) 
 
N=35 
Note that hypothesis tests are directional. When comparing the control and the local saying vignettes, the 
alternative hypothesis states that the local saying hypothesis average should be higher than the control 
hypothesis, while when comparing the local saying hypothesis to the Bible hypothesis, the alternative 
hypothesis expects that the Bible hypothesis average will be lower than the local saying average. Numbers in 
parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. * in the local saying vignette 
category indicates statistical significance at the p<.10 level between the local saying and control groups. * in the 
Bible vignette category indicates statistical significance at the p<0.10 level between the local saying and Bible 
groups. 
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Table 7.  Mean Score on Policy Questions by Vignette among 
Evangelicals  
Mean Index Score Bible Vignette Local Saying Vignette Control Vignette  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.29* 
(2.01, 2.57) 
 
N=24 
2.60*  
(2.40, 2.80) 
 
N=25 
2.27 
(1.99, 2.55) 
 
N=11 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance (Q26) 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.13* 
(1.69, 2.56) 
 
N=24 
2.64* 
(2.11,3.17) 
 
N=25 
2.00 
(1.15, 2.85) 
 
N=11 
Gov’t Reduction of Income 
Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.88 
(1.42, 2.33) 
 
N=24 
2.28* 
(1.72, 2.84) 
 
N=25 
1.18  
(0.43, 1.94) 
 
N=11 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.46* 
(1.06, 1.86) 
 
N=24 
2.08 
(1.62, 2.54) 
 
N=25 
1.64 
(0.81, 2.46) 
 
N=11 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.50  
(2.18, 2.82) 
 
N=24 
2.68* 
(2.32, 3.04) 
 
N=25 
2.09 
(1.41, 2.78) 
 
N=11 
Paid Parental Leave (Q33) 
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.42* 
(3.01, 3.73) 
 
N=24 
3.76* 
(3.55, 3.97) 
 
N=25 
3.27 
(2.88, 3.66) 
 
N=11 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.67 
(1.31, 2.02) 
 
N=24 
1.36 
(1.02, 1.70) 
 
N=25 
1.45 
(0.96, 1.95) 
 
N=11 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations  
1.79* 
(1.45, 2.13) 
 
N=24 
2.16 
(1.72, 2.60) 
 
N=25 
1.73 
(0.91, 2.54) 
 
N=11 
Note that hypothesis tests are directional. When comparing the control and the local saying vignettes, the 
alternative hypothesis states that the local saying hypothesis average should be higher than the control 
hypothesis, while when comparing the local saying hypothesis to the Bible hypothesis, the alternative 
hypothesis expects that the Bible hypothesis average will be lower than the local saying average. Numbers in 
parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. * in the local saying vignette 
category indicates statistical significance at the p<.10 level between the local saying and control groups. * in the 
Bible vignette category indicates statistical significance at the p<0.10 level between the local saying and Bible 
groups. 
First, it should be noted that as I restricted the size of the groups evaluated, the 
standard error drastically increased, thus limiting the overall statistical evaluation of the data 
present. For example, there were only 60 individuals in the dataset who completed the policy 
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questions and classified themselves as Evangelical. The most general takeaway is that the 
overall trend elaborated on in the dual variable model is continued amongst both Protestants 
and Evangelicals - higher scores among the local saying respondents relative to the control 
followed by a lower score amongst those receiving the Bible vignette outside of the 
immigration question.  
For Protestants, paid parental leave is statistically different between the control and 
local saying vignette in the expected direction at the p<0.10 level. Additionally, the 
government paying for health insurance question is extremely close to statistical significance 
at the p<0.10 level. When flipped to analyze the difference between local saying vignette and 
the bible passage, only the health insurance question obtains statistical significance at the 
p<0.05 level, though paid parental leave is relatively close to the p<0.10 level. Again, these 
findings are largely a byproduct of a limited sample size more than anything else. Further, 
these findings lack substantive significance, given the relative closeness of all the mean 
scores per question and vignette.  
Amongst an extremely numerically limited Evangelical respondent group, there is 
more evidence of a statistically important relationship between vignette received and policy 
preference. Questions on the minimum wage, government spending on health insurance, 
government-led reduction of income inequality, federal spending on aid to the poor, and paid 
parental leave demonstrate that there is a difference in the expected direction between the 
control and local saying vignette at the p<0.10 level at the minimum. Similarly, the minimum 
wage, government spending on health insurance, affirmative action, paid parental leave, and 
federal spending on welfare questions all demonstrate statistical difference between the local 
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saying and the Bible vignette in the expected direction at a bare minimum of the p<0.10 
level. Overall, Table 7 presents evidence that the dual variable model applies more to 
Evangelicals than general Protestants; however, similar to the Table 6, limited respondents in 
each category inhibit the overall relevance of this finding. These differences are also 
substantial; among all questions with the right direction of the relationship, as the 
immigration question appears to be capturing something else, there is a .39 point gap 
between the Bible passage and local saying gap on average in 4 and 5 category questions. 
The  gap between the control and the local saying passage for all the questions except the 
immigration question is .57, indicating a massive difference between the control and the local 
saying passage.  
One problem with the comparison in Table 6 and Table 7 is that the groups involved, 
Evangelicals and Protestants, are not mutually exclusive. Everyone who identified as an 
Evangelical is also classified as a Protestant. Table 8 compares non-Evangelical Protestants 
to Evangelicals via mean differences. Negative mean difference scores indicate that 
Evangelicals are more conservative than non-Evangelical Protestants on average. Table 8 is 
somewhat limited in its usefulness by small sample size and a relatively large standard error. 
The Evangelicals yield consistently more conservative answers except for the local saying 
group for the minimum wage and affirmative action questions. Interestingly, outside of the 
affirmative action question, the control vignette mean difference is always more conservative 
than the Bible passage, providing a slight bit of evidence that among evangelicals, the Bible 
slightly reduced their conservative leanings in a non-substantial manner. Overall, it is hard to 
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take anything substantial away from Table 8. Each question has at least 2 categories that are 
not statistically different from zero, largely due to an increasingly tiny sample size.  
Table 8. Difference in Mean Score on Policy Questions by Vignette 
Difference of Mean Score 
(Evangelical - 
non-Evangelical 
Protestant) 
Bible Vignette Local Saying Vignette Control Vignette 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
-0.35​a 
(-0.73, 0.03) 
0.10​a 
(-0.21, 0.41) 
-0.39 
(-0.75, -0.04) 
 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
-0.63 
(-1.22, -0.03) 
-0.56​a 
(-1.23, 0.11) 
-0.79​a 
(-1.74, 0.16) 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
-0.66​a 
(-1.35, 0.03) 
-0.07​a  
(-0.94, 0.80) 
-1.15  
(-2.12, -0.18) 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
-0.68 
(-1.31, -0.06) 
0.08​a 
(-0.66, 0.82) 
-0.28​a 
(-1.21, 0.65) 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
-0.28​a 
(-0.77, 0.21) 
-0.17​a  
(-0.72, 0.38) 
-0.74​a 
(-1.54, 0.06) 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
-0.25​a  
(-0.66, 0.16) 
0.11​a 
(-0.22, 0.44) 
-0.31​a 
(-0.83, 0.21) 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
-0.15​a 
(-0.60, 0.30) 
-0.34​a 
(-0.91, 0.23) 
-0.55​a 
(-1.16, 0.07) 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
-0.62 
(-1.18, -0.55) 
-0.39​a 
(-1.02, 0.24) 
-0.77​a 
(-1.63, 0.08) 
n​a​ indicates that the result is not statistically different from zero. Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 
percent confidence interval for the value above it.  
Overall, with regards to Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b, and Hypothesis 2, the data 
provided a sound rejection of all three theories. Hypothesis 1a’s theory that Christians who 
received the Bible passage would be more liberal than those in the control group was soundly 
rejected via Table 5, as it found that the Bible passage vignette mean score was very similar 
to the control vignette. Similarly, among Evangelicals, the Bible passage vignette mean score 
rarely was more liberal than the control vignette, much less in a statistically significant 
manner, therefore rejecting Hypothesis 1b. Hypothesis 2 was firmly rejected as well: overall, 
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except for the immigration question, the Christians who received the Bible passage were 
more conservative on average than the local saying passage group. In the process of testing 
these hypotheses, I discovered a new potential theory that the Bible acts as a conservative cue 
that can override the effect of a message. I provided statistical evidence, particularly among 
evangelicals, that the Bible serves as a conservative cue even if the message is inherently 
liberal. Further, we saw that the message given does matter, given the differences between 
the control group and the local saying vignette. While my hypotheses were firmly rejected, 
the data provide a more interesting and nuanced picture between the interplay of the Bible 
cue and the message, more than previously hypothesized.  
Next, I addressed Hypothesis 3a, which stated the following: when exposed to a 
biblical text with a political message, more religious people will be more in line with the 
political leanings of the text relative to less religious people. To analyze this hypothesis, I 
first created a religiosity index, which consisted of  questions on how often the respondent 
attended religious services, how often they talk about their faith with non-believers, how 
often they talk about faith with believers, how often they read scripture, and how often they 
pray, as asked via Q6, Q11, Q12, Q14, and Q67. This index has a Cronbach’s alpha score of 
0.8595, indicating a substantial intercorrelation of items testing the same concept of 
religiosity. Notably, I left off Q9, which addressed biblical literalism - when included in the 
index, the Cronbach’s alpha score dropped to 0.1333. The religiosity index had a range of 
scores from 0 to 23, with 0 being the least religious and 23 being the most religious. I 
classified people as highly religious if they score a 16 or above on the index, medium 
religiosity if they scored between a 8 and a 15, and as low religiosity if it was below a 7. The 
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results are displayed in Table 9 below for respondents who received the Bible treatment. If 
Hypothesis 3 is correct, people with higher religiosity scores should hold higher values, 
hence, more liberal views, on each question than people who are less religious.  
From a visual standpoint, a clear trend emerges in Table 9: people with low and 
medium levels of religiosity are roughly the same across questions. However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 3, the most religious consistently hold the most conservative responses. When 
comparing average mean differences by religiosity category, there are clear substantial 
differences: there is a 0.68 gap between the low religiosity and the high religiosity people, 
while there is an almost 0.56 gap between the medium religiosity and the high religiosity 
folks. Outside of the immigration question, all differences by question and statistically 
significant at the p<0.05 level or lower. Table 10 compares across the religiosity index for 
people who received the Bible treatment and are Christians.  
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Table 9.  Mean Score and Statistical Significance on Policy Questions by Religiosity,  Bible 
Treatment Condition Only 
Mean Index Score Low Religiosity Medium Religiosity High Religiosity  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.84* 
(2.72, 2.97) 
 
N=45 
2.81* 
(2.70, 2.93) 
 
N=48 
2.28 
(2.02, 2.53) 
 
N=40 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.31* 
(3.05, 3.57) 
 
 
N=45 
3.06* 
(2.80, 3.33) 
 
 
N=48 
2.23 
(1.89, 2.56) 
 
 
N=40 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.73* 
(2.36, 3.09) 
 
N=44 
2.65* 
(2.27, 3.02) 
 
N=48 
2.00 
(1.58, 2.41) 
 
N=40 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.36* 
(2.01, 2.70)  
 
N=45 
1.96* 
(1.64, 2.28) 
 
N=48 
1.48 
(1.13, 1.82) 
 
N=40 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.09* 
(2.82, 3.36) 
 
N=44 
3.06* 
(2.83, 3.29) 
 
N=48 
2.53 
(2.22, 2.83) 
 
N=40 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.77* 
(3.59, 3.95) 
 
N=44 
3.71* 
(3.54, 3.87) 
 
N=48 
3.35 
(3.04, 3.66) 
 
N=40 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.02* 
(1.77, 2.28) 
 
N=44 
1.90 
(1.65, 2.14) 
 
N=48 
1.68 
(1.42, 1.93)  
 
N=40 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
  
   ​Number of Observations 
2.77* 
(2.45, 3.10) 
 
N=44 
2.75* 
(2.48, 3.02) 
 
N=48 
1.90 
(1.53, 2.27) 
 
N=40 
Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. A * beside the low 
religiosity score indicates a statistically different test between people with low religiosity and high religiosity at 
the p<0.10 level with a one-tailed t-test, with the alternative hypothesis being that the highly religious maintain 
less liberal views. a * beside the medium religiosity category indicates that for that particular question, a 
one-tailed t-test between the medium religiosity respondents and the high religiosity respondents is statistically 
significant at the p<0.10 level,  with the alternative hypothesis stating that the highly religious will have less 
liberal policy scores on average.  
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Table 10.  Mean Score and Statistical Significance on Policy Questions by Religiosity, Bible 
Treatment Condition Only Among Christians  
Mean Index Score Low Religiosity Medium Religiosity High Religiosity  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
2.80*  
(2,53, 3.07) 
 
N=10 
2.78* 
(2.61, 2.96) 
 
N=23 
2.19 
(1.88, 2.49) 
 
N=32 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.20* 
(2.70, 3.70) 
 
 
N=10 
2.74* 
(2.30, 3.18) 
 
 
N=23 
2.19 
(1.79, 2.58) 
 
 
N=32 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  Number of Observations 
1.70  
(0.91, 2.49) 
 
N=10 
2.52* 
(1.96, 3.08) 
 
N=23 
1.97 
(1.50, 2.44) 
 
N=32 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.80*  
(2.08, 3.52) 
 
N=10 
2.09* 
(1.59, 2.59) 
 
N=23 
1.53 
(1.16, 1.90) 
 
N=32 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.78 
(2.22, 3.33) 
 
N=9 
2.87* 
(2.53, 3.21) 
 
N=23 
2.50 
(2.18, 2.82) 
 
N=32 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.67* 
(3.20, 4.14) 
 
N=9 
3.70* 
(3.46, 3.93) 
 
N=23 
3.25 
(2.87, 3.63) 
 
N=32 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.89 
(1.37, 2.41) 
 
N=9 
1.74 
(1.36, 2.12) 
 
N=23 
1.69 
(1.41, 1.96) 
 
N=32 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.33 
(1.59, 3.08) 
 
N=9 
2.43* 
(2.02, 2.85) 
 
N=23 
1.88 
(1.48, 2.27) 
 
N=32 
Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it. A * beside the low 
religiosity score indicates a statistically different test between people with low religiosity and high religiosity at 
the p<0.10 level with a one-tailed t-test, with the alternative hypothesis being that the highly religious maintain 
less liberal views. a * beside the medium religiosity category indicates that for that particular question, a 
one-tailed t-test between the medium religiosity respondents and the high religiosity respondents is statistically 
significant at the p<0.10 level,  with the alternative hypothesis stating that the highly religious will have less 
liberal policy scores on average.  
Table 10 enforces the general trend of Table 9; however, claims of statistical 
significance are reduced, primarily due to working with a relatively small number of 
observations. Immigration is not statistically significant at all, while aid to the poor and 
Hughes 40 
government reduction of income inequality produce conflicting results. However, taken 
cumulatively, highly religious Christians seem to favor more conservative opinions than less 
religious Christians.  
There is a potential problem within this comparison, however: Table 9 and Table 10 
do not control for ideological identity. It is possible that people who are more religious are 
just more conservative, thus causing the more conservative responses. Table 11, which is 
positioned on the next page, performs the same exercises as Table 9, but only among 
conservatives to control for ideological identity.  
As seen from Table 11, it appears that ideology plays a role in religiosity, given that 
Table 11 findings are largely within the 95 percent confidence interval of one another, 
though this is probably more so an artifact of a limited sample. In terms of a general trend, 
however, highly religious individuals give more conservative answers than their peers. 
Interestingly, it appears that the medium-level religious individuals are the most liberal. 
Table 11 should not be taken as a cumulative rejection of the trend established in Table 9 
linking higher religiosity with more conservative policy preferences, as Table 11 suffers from 
relatively few observations: 43 for all questions outside of question 28, which had 42 
observations. Next, I examined religiosity’s impact amongst self-identified liberals who 
received the Bible treatment in Table 12 for a final test of Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 11.  Mean Score on Policy Questions by Religiosity,  Bible Treatment Condition and 
Conservative Only 
Mean Index Score Low Religiosity Medium Religiosity High Religiosity  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.44  
(1.96, 2.93) 
 
N=9 
2.55 
(2.23, 2.86) 
 
N=11 
2.04 
(1.65, 2.43) 
 
N=23 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.11 
(1.59, 2.64) 
 
 
N=9 
2.45 
(1.77, 3.14) 
 
 
N=11 
1.83 
(1.43, 2.22) 
 
 
N=23 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.75 
(0.62, 2.88) 
 
N=8 
1.82 
(1.01, 2.63) 
 
N=11 
1.35 
(0.90, 1.80) 
 
N=23 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
1.56 
(0.72, 2.39) 
 
N=9 
1.73 
(1.00, 2.45) 
 
N=11 
1.26 
(0.82, 1.70) 
 
N=23 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
  
 ​Number of Observations 
1.89 
(1.48, 2.29) 
 
N=9 
2.55 
(1.98, 3.11) 
 
N=11 
2.13 
(1.72, 2.54) 
 
N=23 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.33 
(2.75, 3.92) 
 
N=9 
3.64 
(3.23, 4.05) 
 
N=11 
3.04 
(2.56, 3.53) 
 
N=23 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
Number of Observations 
1.00  
(0.33, 1.67) 
 
N=9 
1.00  
(0.53, 1.47) 
 
N=11 
1.35 
(0.98, 1.72) 
 
N=23 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
Number of Observations 
1.22 
(0.57, 1.88) 
 
N=9 
2.00 
(1.46, 2.54) 
 
N=11 
1.43 
(0.93, 1.94) 
 
N=23 
Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it.  
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Table 12.  Mean Score on Policy Questions by Religiosity,  Bible Treatment Condition and 
Liberal Only 
Mean Index Score Low Religiosity Medium Religiosity High Religiosity  
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations  
2.96 
(2.88, 3.04) 
 
N=26 
2.96 
(2.88, 3.04) 
 
N=25 
2.88 
(2.62, 3.13) 
 
N=8 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.88 
(3.76, 4.01) 
 
 
N=26 
3.56 
(3.33, 3.79) 
 
 
N=25 
3.00  
(2.00, 4.00) 
 
 
N=8 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.35 
(3.05, 3.64) 
 
N=26 
3.20 
(2.77, 3.63) 
 
N=25 
3.50  
(3.12, 3.88) 
 
N=8 
Affirmative Action (Q30) 
  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.50 
(2.04, 2.96) 
 
N=26 
2.36 
(1.91, 2.81) 
 
N=25 
1.88 
(1.08, 2.67) 
 
N=8 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.62 
(3.42, 3.81) 
 
N=26 
3.44 
(3.18, 3.70) 
 
N=25 
3.34 
(3.01, 3.74) 
 
N=8 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
4. 00 
(N/A) 
 
N=26 
3.84 
(3.65, 4.03) 
 
N=25 
4.00 
(N/A) 
 
N=8 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.38 
(2.16, 2.61) 
 
N=26 
2.16 
(1.84, 2.48) 
 
N=25 
2.25 
(1.92, 2.58) 
 
N=8 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.38 
(3.13, 3.63) 
 
N=26 
3.32 
(3.07, 3.57) 
 
N=25 
2.75 
(2.25, 3.25) 
 
N=8 
Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the value above it.  
As seen in Table 12, Hypothesis 3a is soundly rejected among liberals as well. The highly 
religious category is often within the 95 percent confidence interval of the other categories. 
The question on government spending on healthcare insurance and affirmative action at the 
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highest religiosity level possess an average score not in the confidence intervals of the other 
levels of religiosity; however, it is the opposite direction forecast by Hypothesis 3a. Taken 
cumulatively, it appears that higher levels of religiosity does not necessarily mean more 
compliance with the political message of a religious text.  
As noted earlier, the biblical literalism question did not fit with the religiosity index. 
However, this could be a potential measure of religiosity for only Christians given the lack of 
relevance to other groups. Table 13 offers a quick examination of that theory. For Hypothesis 
3a’s purposes, outside of the affirmative action question, the results for the biblical literalism 
analysis do not go in the correct direction nor do they meet a level of statistical significance. 
Taken together, the results of the analysis conducted on Hypothesis 3a leads me to firmly 
reject the notion that more religious people will be affected at a greater level by the political 
leanings of a religious text.  
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Table 13. Mean Score on Policy Preferences for Christians by Biblical 
Literalism, Bible Passage Only 
Mean Index Score Non-Biblical Literalists Biblical Literalists 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
2.53 
(2.32, 2.73) 
 
N=55 
2.38 
(2.01, 2.74) 
 
N=8 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
   ​Number of Observations 
2.58 
(2.28, 2.89) 
 
 
N=55 
2.25  
(1.52, 2.98) 
 
 
N=8 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
   ​Number of Observations 
2.15 
(1.78, 2.51) 
 
N=55 
1.75 
(0.84, 2.66) 
 
N=8 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
 ​Number of Observations 
1.93 
(1.60, 2.25) 
 
N=55 
2.00  
(1.16, 2.84) 
 
N=8 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
   ​Number of Observations 
2.67 
(2.43, 2.90) 
 
N=54 
2.63 
(1.88, 3.37) 
 
N=8 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
3.48 
(3.24, 3.73) 
 
N=54 
3.25 
(2.62, 3.88) 
 
N=8 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
   ​Number of Observations 
1.80 
(1.58, 2.01) 
 
N=54 
1.38 
(0.63, 2.12) 
 
N=8 
Welfare Spending (Q31) 
 
  
   ​Number of Observations 
2.12 
(1.86, 2.47) 
 
N=54 
1.75 
(1.12, 2.38) 
 
N=8 
   ​Note that all numbers in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval. 
Hypothesis 3b aims to compare Christians and non-Christians across the spectrum of 
religiosity. It is expected that Christians will be more liberal than non-Christians, as 
represented by more liberal scores, particularly at higher levels of religiosity, in building off 
the assumptions of Hypothesis 3a. To compare these groups, I measured the mean 
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differences between Christians and non-Christians across the scale of religiosity on all policy 
questions. Negative scores indicate that non-Christians were more liberal, while positive 
scores indicate that Christians are more liberal. Table 14 indicates the results below:  
Table 14. Difference in Mean Score on Policy Questions by Religiosity, Christians to 
Non-Christians 
Difference of Mean Score 
(Christian-non 
Christian) 
Low Religiosity 
 
 
Medium Religiosity 
 
 
High Religiosity 
 
 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
-0.20​a 
(-0.47, 0.07) 
 
N=(27-123) 
-0.06​a 
(-0.22, 0.10) 
 
N=(67-63) 
-0.12​a 
(-0.41, 0.17) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  Number of Observations 
-0.39 
(-0.76, -0.01) 
 
 
N=(27-123) 
-0.18​a 
(-0.51, 0.16) 
 
 
N=(67-63) 
-0.13​a 
(-0.67, 0.40) 
 
 
N=(76-26) 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.87 
(-1.36, -0.37) 
 
N=(27-122) 
-0.35​a  
(-0.79, 0.09) 
 
N=(67-63) 
0.11​a 
(-0.51, 0.72) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.01​a 
(-0.50, -0.49) 
 
N=(27-123) 
0.31​a 
(-0.07, 0.69) 
 
N=(67-63) 
0.23​a 
(-0.33, 0.78) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.43 
(-0.83, -0.04) 
 
N=(26-121) 
-0.18​a 
(-0.48, 0.12) 
 
N=(67-61) 
0.23​a  
(-0.22, 0.68) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.09​a 
(-0.39, -.21) 
 
N=(26-121) 
-0.08​a 
(-0.26, 0.10) 
 
N=(67-60) 
0.01​a 
(-0.38, 0.40) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.24​a  
(-0.59, 0.11) 
 
N=(26-121) 
-0.10​a 
(-0.40, 0.20) 
 
N=(67-61) 
0.14​a 
(-0.25, 0.53) 
 
N=(76-26) 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  Number of Observations 
-0.50 
(-0.93, -0.06) 
 
N=(26-121) 
-0.31​a 
(-0.64, 0.03) 
 
N=(67-61) 
0.15​a  
(-0.37, 0.68) 
 
N=(76-26) 
n​a​ indicates that the result is not statistically different from zero. Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 
percent confidence interval for the value above it. The number of observations is presented in the format 
N=(​a​-​b​), where ​a​ indicates Christians and ​b​ indicates non-Christians.  
Hughes 46 
Table 14 produced fascinating but statistically insignificant results. From a trend 
perspective, outside of the affirmative action question, as religiosity increased, the gap 
between Christians and non-Christians decreased; that is, in the aggregate, Christians were 
more liberal than their non-Christian peers as they became more religious. In particular, it is 
notable how in six of eight questions, highly religious Christians had a higher average score 
than highly religious non-Christians. However, Table 14 struggles in that all but four results 
in the table are not statistically different from zero. Further, Table 14 does not test 
Hypothesis 3b, as it includes all people regardless of vignette received. Table 15  tests only 
among those who received the Bible passage vignette. 
In Table 15, the trend established in Table 14 all but vanishes. Only the aid to the 
poor question reduces the gap in the manner observed in Table 14. Except for the affirmative 
action question and the highly religious category of the immigration question, Christians are 
more conservative than their non-Christian peers on average. Further, all but two results are 
not statistically different from zero. This led me to conclude with confidence that amongst 
respondents receiving the Bible passage, Christians do not appear to be more liberal than 
non-Christians.  
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Table 15. Difference in Mean Score on Policy Questions by Religiosity, Christians to 
Non-Christians, Bible Vignette Only 
Difference of Mean Score 
(Christian-non 
Christian) 
 
Low Religiosity Medium Religiosity High Religiosity 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.06​a 
(-0.37, 0.25) 
 
N=(10-35) 
-0.06​a 
(-0.29, 0.17) 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.44​a 
(-1.08, 0.21) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.14​a 
(-0.78, 0.50) 
 
 
N=(10-35) 
-0.62 
(-1.14, -0.10) 
 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.19​a 
(-1.06, 0.68) 
 
 
N=(32-8) 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-1.33 
(-2.13, -0.53) 
 
N=(10-34) 
-0.24​a 
(-1.01, 0.53) 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.16​a 
(-1.24, 0.93) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
0.57​a 
(-0.27, 1.41) 
 
N=(10-35) 
0.25​a  
(-0.40, 0.90) 
 
N=(23-25) 
0.28​a 
(-0.61, 1.18) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.39​a 
(-1.08, 0.29) 
 
N=(9-35) 
-0.37​a 
(-0.83, 0.09) 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.13​a 
(-0.92, 0.67) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.13​a 
(-0.59, 0.33) 
 
N=(9-35) 
-0.02​a 
(-0.37, 0.32) 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.50​a 
(-1.29, -0.29) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.17​a 
(-0.81, 0.48) 
 
N=(9-35) 
-0.30​a 
(-0.80, 0.19) 
 
N=(23-25) 
0.07​a 
(-0.61, 0.73) 
 
N=(32-8) 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​ Number of Observations 
-0.55​a 
(-1.37, 0.27) 
 
N=(9-35) 
-0.61 
(-1.14, -0.07) 
 
N=(23-25) 
-0.13​a 
(-1.07, 0.82) 
 
N=(32-8) 
 ​n​a​ indicates that the result is not statistically different from zero. Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 
percent confidence interval for the value above it. The number of observations is presented in the format 
N=(​a​-​b​), where ​a​ indicates Christians and ​b​ indicates non-Christians.  
My final hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, posits that as people become more political, they 
will be less in line with the biblical message. To measure this, I created an index of political 
involvement. The index combined questions on whether the respondent had attended a march 
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or rally in the past year, signed a petition on a political issue, worked for a campaign or party, 
and if they posted something political on social media, all within the last year. Overall, the 
index has a Cronbach’s alpha score of  0.70 when rounded to the nearest hundredth. I 
classified people as highly politically active if they score a 3 or above on the index, medium 
levels of political involvement if they scored a 2, and low levels of political involvement if 
they were at or below 1. This was on a 0-4 point scale. To measure this, I took the differences 
between the control vignette score and the Bible vignette score across questions. If 
Hypothesis 4 is supported, people with low political involvement should have the largest 
positive integer of the three groups, followed by the local saying vignette, and then the Bible 
vignette. According to Hypothesis 4, people with the highest level of political involvement 
should be the least in line with the vignettes, indicating a low, close to zero positive number. 
Negative numbers indicate a theoretical flaw, as that implies that the respondents were made 
more conservative by the Bible passage, which is not accounted for in Hypothesis 4. Table 
16 presents the results of said analysis.  
As seen in Table 16, the data do not support Hypothesis 4. Each question has at least 
one negative number, and half the time it is the highly politically involved with a negative 
number. More importantly, all 95 percent confidence intervals include zero, indicating that 
the net difference between groups is possibly zero, meaning the Bible passage vignette had 
no effect on respondent’s political preferences. However, it should be noted that there was an 
extremely limited sample size for this exercise with groups often numbering in the 20’s. 
Additionally, this could also be impacted by the message itself: in this case, the message was 
inherently liberal. Table 17 offers the same comparison as Table 16, but only among liberals. 
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Table 16. Difference in Mean Score on Policy Questions by Political Involvement  
Difference of Mean Score 
(Bible-Control) 
Low Political 
Involvement 
Medium Political 
Involvement  
High Political 
Involvement 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  Number of Observations 
0.10​a 
(-0.10, 0.30) 
 
N=(86-70) 
-0.10​a 
(-0.34, 0.15) 
 
N=(29-28) 
-0.09​a 
(-0.44, 0.27) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.08​a 
(-0.42, 0.26) 
 
 
N=(86-70) 
0.06​a 
(-0.47, 0.59) 
 
 
N=(29-28) 
-0.11​a 
(-0.74, 0.51) 
 
 
N=(18-22) 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  Number of Observations 
-0.07​a 
(-0.48, 0.34) 
 
N=(85-70) 
-0.07​a 
(-0.69, 0.55) 
 
N=(29-28) 
-0.06​a 
(-0.84, 0.72) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Affirmative Action (Q30) 
  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.10​a 
(-0.44, 0.25) 
 
N=(86-70) 
0.24​a 
(-0.45, 0.93) 
 
N=(29-28) 
0.11​a 
(-0.53, 0.75) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.02​a 
(-0.27, 0.31) 
 
N=(86-69) 
-0.04​a 
(-0.56, 0.49) 
 
N=(28-28) 
0.38​a 
(-0.23, 0.99) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.02​a 
(-0.22, 0.26) 
 
N=(86-69) 
0.21​a 
(-0.05, 0.48) 
 
N=(28-28) 
-0.04​a 
(-0.51, 0.43) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.13​a 
(-0.40, 0.13) 
 
N=(86-69) 
-0.14​a 
(-0.57, 0.28) 
 
N=(28-28) 
0.32​a 
(-0.21, 0.85) 
 
N=(18-22) 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.15​a 
(-0.48, 0.18) 
 
N=(86-69) 
-0.21​a 
(-0.79, 0.36) 
 
N=(28-28 
0.13​a 
(-0.53, 0.78) 
 
N=(18-22) 
n​a​ indicates that the result is not statistically different from zero. Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 
percent confidence interval for the value above it. The number of observations is presented in the format 
N=(​a​-​b​), where ​a​ indicates respondents who received the Bible passage and their specified level of political 
involvement and ​b​ indicates respondents who received the control passage and their specified level of political 
involvement.  
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Table 17. Difference in Mean Score on Policy Questions by Political Involvement Among 
Liberals  
Difference of Mean Score 
(Bible-Control) 
Low Political 
Involvement 
Medium Political 
Involvement  
High Political 
Involvement 
Minimum Wage (Q25) 
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.24​a 
(-0.06, 0.54) 
 
N=(25-25) 
-0.01​a 
(-0.15, 0.14)  
 
N=(19-21) 
0.00​a 
(0.00, 0.00) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Gov’t Spending on 
Healthcare Insurance 
(Q26) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.28​a 
(-0.17, 0.73) 
 
 
N=(25-25) 
0.06​a 
(-0.45, 0.56) 
 
 
N=(19-21) 
-0.06​a  
(-0.36, 0.25) 
 
 
N=(15-19) 
Gov’t Reduction of 
Income Inequality (Q28)  
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.04​a 
(-0.56, 0.64) 
 
N=(25-25) 
-0.06​a 
(-0.47, 0.36) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.01​a  
(-0.53, 0.54) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Affirmative Action (Q30)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.28​a 
(-0.88, 0.32) 
 
N=(25-25) 
0.64​a 
(-0.15, 1.43) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.04​a 
(-0.60, 0.67) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Aid to Poor (Q58)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.28​a 
(-0.18, 0.74) 
 
N=(25-25) 
0.00​a 
(-0.36, 0.36) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.22​a 
(-0.15, 0.59) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Paid Parental Leave 
(Q33) 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
0.36​a  
(0.05, 0.67) 
 
N=(25-25) 
0.13​a 
(-0.19, 0.45) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.00​a 
(0.00, 0.00) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Immigration (Q35)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.32​a 
(-0.74, 0.10) 
 
N=(25-25) 
-0.09​a 
(-0.49, 0.32) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.26​a  
(-0.08, 0.60) 
 
N=(15-19) 
Welfare Spending (Q31)  
 
 
  ​Number of Observations 
-0.04​a 
(-0.43, 0.35) 
 
N=(25-25) 
-0.02​a 
(-0.46, 0.42) 
 
N=(19-21) 
0.10​a  
(-0.24, 0.44) 
 
N=(15-19) 
n​a​ indicates that the result is not statistically different from zero. Numbers in parentheses represent the 95 
percent confidence interval for the value above it. The number of observations is presented in the format 
N=(​a​-​b​), where ​a​ indicates liberals who received the Bible passage and their specified level of political 
involvement and ​b​ indicates liberals who received the control passage and their specified level of political 
involvement.  
Table 17 offers few definitive answers regarding the impact of ideology. Due to a 
small sample size, all results in Table 17 are indistinguishable from zero, therefore offering 
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reinforcing evidence from Table 16 that political involvement did not impact the 
interpretation of the Bible message. Unfortunately, a similar operation is not possible among 
conservatives due to extremely small sample size: for example, there were only two highly 
sophisticated conservatives that received the Bible treatment and three highly sophisticated 
conservatives that received the control passage, making meaningful statistical analysis 
impossible. However, taken cumulatively,  I offer a significant amount of evidence against 
Hypothesis 4, which stated that the highly politically sophisticated would be less in line with 
the Bible passage relative to the less politically sophisticated via Table 16 and Table 17. 
Limitations 
Like all research, there are several limitations to the findings in this study. First, the research 
was conducted on a relatively small convenience sample of college students at a regional 
university, which makes the results less generalizable. For some comparisons, this made it 
especially tough to come to any firm conclusions given a relatively high standard error, 
particularly when I examined Evangelicals across vignettes of level of religiosity. However, 
if anything, this would undersell the actual effects of the Bible, given that younger 
generations tend to be less religious (Brauer 2018). The treatment categories also assume a 
lack of biblical literacy among the people taking the survey, and while they are not the most 
common verses cited in the Bible, it is possible that a casual Christian could recognize the 
“local saying” as a Bible verse, thus clouding the results of the research. However, this seems 
to be a relatively unlikely possibility, but it is something to be aware of, given I do not test 
for biblical literacy in this survey. To some extent, this research does not have a great deal of 
external validity – it is unlikely that a person would just pick up a copy of the Bible, turn to a 
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certain page, and their policy preferences are changed based on what they read. More often 
than not, the Bible verse will probably be presented in a similar method to Wallsten and 
Nteta’s (2016) vignettes: via a preacher in a larger body of rhetoric. However, my research 
isolates the effect of the Bible, thus defining a variable rather than leaving it unknown.  
To some extent, the results of the analysis to test Hypothesis 4 suggests that the 
vignettes did not really affect the outcomes of the personal policy preferences. However, the 
analysis in Hypothesis 4 was extremely limited due to sample size, and when analyzing 
Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 2, Christians were affected by the vignettes in a statistically 
significant way. If the results hold true for Hypothesis 4 with a larger sample size, from a 
normative perspective, it is not a horrible thing that people’s political beliefs are not changed 
by a quick exposure to a short reading. 
Finally, the time period under which the survey research was conducted was beyond 
unusual: the data collection period took place during the COVID-19 crisis, thus introducing a 
whole host of potential complicating factors that influence the respondents’ behavior – 
perhaps in the time of crisis, they have become more religious than they usually would be, 
thus clouding the results of the religiosity index and the overall data pattern. However, due to 
Appalachian State University moving all courses online for the near future, it is possible that 
overall response rates are higher than they would be if classes were still being conducted in 
person, given that this survey is conducted online as well; however, the opposite 
counterfactual is unfortunately not something I tested.  
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Conclusion 
Overall, through this project, I have explained the relevant literature and contributed a 
tiny morsel to the scholarship on the intersection of religion and American politics. Zaller 
(1992) established the role of elites in public opinion development, and in building off of that 
model, I tested whether the Bible can act as its own form of elite message. I implemented 
Festinger’s (1957) model of cognitive dissonance within my theoretical framework; 
ultimately, I feel I underestimated the respondents’ willingness to dismiss the meaning of the 
political message when it conflicted with already-held beliefs. Wallsten and Nteta (2016) 
found that clergy using a Bible verse can influence the political opinions of their 
congregations; I directly isolated the effect of the Bible and eliminated the middle man. In 
isolating the effect of the Bible, I provided evidence that the role of the preacher is 
substantial in influencing peoples’ policy preferences, a la Djupe and Calfano (2013). 
However, Wallsten and Nteta’s (2016) work seems somewhat policy specific, as the topic of 
immigration was the only policy area that largely followed the pattern described in my 
theory. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee’s (1954) implied hierarchy of identity model also 
feel short. Further, my theory was rejected in the face of the data: Christians nor Evangelicals 
did not become more liberal following exposure to a liberal Bible message, the Bible label 
does not appear to act as a cue to amplify the main ideas of a liberal message, the most 
religious are not affected more by a liberal Bible passage, nor are the most politically 
involved less affected by the Bible. However, in examining Hypothesis 1, 1.1, and 2, a 
potential new theory came to light, of which I offered evidence, particularly among 
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Evangelicals: it appears that people can be affected by a liberal message, but when the 
respondents are informed that the message is from the Bible, it appears that the Bible label 
itself acts as a independent conservative cue. In particular, this discovery warrants more 
explanation, particularly on a nationally representative sample.  
At a minimum, this project poses questions and ideas for future research. In 
particular, this research utilized only two liberal Bible passages; it would be interesting to 
examine different Bible passages, including ones with a conservative message. Further, it 
would be intriguing to give people multiple Bible passages, particularly ones with conflicting 
ideologies in order to see how they handle the message. From a comparative perspective, this 
project can be replicated with other religions’ holy texts in order to see differences between 
religious groups. Overall, at its core, the best thing a research project can do is provoke 
further inquiry - I believe that this project does just that, as with every question we ask and 
attempt to answer, the following engagement helps us understand the world and its processes 
a bit better each time.  
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Appendix 1: Survey Layout  
1. Introduction Block: Thank you for your interest in this survey on the interaction of 
various demographics, religion, pop culture, and politics. This survey is for an honors 
thesis at Appalachian State University in both university honors and departmental 
honors. All answers will be kept completely confidential. This survey will take less 
than ten minutes. At the end of the survey, there is a link provided to enter 
information to receive extra credit for your class if offered by the recommending 
professor - these data are kept separately from the main survey data to ensure 
confidentiality. Please answer the questions in the manner that best describes you. 
Thank you for helping provide valuable data!  
2. Religious Identification  
a. Q2: Do you consider yourself Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, 
agnostic, an atheist, or something else? ( modified ANES Question - more 
categories) 
i. Protestant  
ii. Roman Catholic  
iii. Jewish  
iv. Muslim  
v. Agnostic  
vi. Atheist  
vii. Something else  
b. (If Protestant is selected) Q53: Do you consider yourself Evangelical?  
i. Yes 
ii. No  
iii. Not sure  
3. Religiosity Index Part 1 (All questions randomized within block)  
a. Introduction: The following questions deal with your religious beliefs. Please 
select the answer that best represents your actions or beliefs.  
b. Q6: Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious 
services? (Pew) 
i. More than once a week  
ii. Once a week  
iii. Once or twice a month  
iv. A few times a year  
v. Seldom  
vi. Never  
c. Q9: Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about 
the Bible? (modified ANES) 
i. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word 
for word.  
ii. The Bible is the world of God but not everything in it should be taken 
literally.  
iii. The Bible is a book written by humans but inspired by God.  
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iv. The Bible is a book written by humans and is not the word of God.  
v. Other (Please Specify)  
d. Q14: How often do you discuss your religious faith/beliefs with non-believers 
or people from other religious backgrounds? (modified Pew)  
i. At least once a week  
ii. Once or twice a month  
iii. Several times a year  
iv. Seldom  
v. Never  
4. Religiosity Index Part 2 (All questions randomized within the block)  
a. Q12: How often do you read scripture outside of religious services? (Pew) 
i. At least once a week  
ii. Once or twice a month  
iii. Several times a year  
iv. Seldom  
v. Never  
b. Q11: People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending 
religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a 
week, once a week, a few times a month, seldom, or never? (Pew) 
i. Several times a day  
ii. Once a day  
iii. A few times a week  
iv. Once a week  
v. A few times a month  
vi. Seldom  
vii. Never  
c. Q67: How often do you discuss your religious faith/beliefs with people who 
share your religious beliefs? (modified Pew) 
i.  At least once a week  
ii. Once or twice a month  
iii. Several times a year  
iv. Seldom  
v. Never  
5. Political Involvement Index  
a. Introduction: Next you will be asked about your level of political 
involvement. Please select the answer choice that best represents your past 
actions.  
b. In the past twelve (12) months, have you participated in the following 
activities? (ANES) 
i. Q69_1: Attended a protest, march, demonstration, or rally  
1. Yes, have participated  
2. No, have not participated  
ii. Q69_2: Signed a petition on a political issue (modified) 
1. Yes, have participated  
2. No, have not participated  
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iii. Q69_3: Worked for a political campaign or party (original) 
1. Yes, have participated  
2. No, have not participated  
iv. Q69_4: Made a political post on social media (original) 
1. Yes, have participated  
2. No, have not participated  
6. Vignettes Block (all passages randomly assigned)  
a. Introduction: Next, you will be presented with a short passage of text. The 
text’s origin is specified in the first sentence of the text displayed. Please read 
the passage carefully.  
b. The following passages are from the Bible. James 2:14-17: “What good is it, 
my brothers, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can that 
faith save him? If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and lacking in daily 
food, and one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, be warmed and filled,’ 
without giving them the things needed for the body, what good is that? So also 
faith by itself, if it does not have works, is dead.” Luke 3:11: “Anyone who 
has two shirts should share with the one who has none, and anyone who has 
food should do the same.”  
c. The following passages are local sayings. What good is it, my brothers, if 
someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can that faith save him? 
If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and lacking in daily food, and one of 
you says to them, “Go in peace, be warmed and filled,” without giving them 
the things needed for the body, what good is that? So also faith by itself, if it 
does not have works, is dead. Anyone who has two shirts should share with 
the one who has none, and anyone who has food should do the same. 
d. The following is a short excerpt from an online news story. Cell phones are a 
literal pain in the neck -- and face, eyes, nose, ears and head. A new study 
analyzing national emergency room data shows injuries to those areas of our 
bodies have risen "steeply" over the last 20 years. The study found most 
injuries occurred to people between the ages of 13 and 29 and were due to 
distracted driving, walking and texting with a cell phone. Cuts to the face and 
head were the most common injuries, followed by contusions -- bruising of 
the brain -- abrasions and internal organ injuries. Most people were treated 
and released instead of hospitalized. While these injuries may not appear to be 
of major concern, the study said, there can be long-term consequences. (CNN) 
7. Video Distractor Block  
a. Introduction: Please pay attention to the following video, as it is important for 
the following questions. Please make sure the sound on your device is on. ​If 
you are taking the survey on a mobile device, please rotate it horizontally.  
b. Video - America’s Funniest Home Videos: Hilarious Birthday Fails  
c. In the first video segment shown, what was the main color of the cake 
frosting?  
i. Brown  
ii. White  
iii. Black  
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iv. Blue  
d. How many times did a table collapse in the entire video?  
i. Once  
ii. Twice  
iii. Three times  
iv. Four times 
8. Policy Index Block, Part 1 (All questions randomized within the block)  
a. Introduction: Next are a few questions on your political policy preferences. 
Please select the answer choice that most accurately describes your beliefs. 
b. Q25: Should the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour be raised, kept the 
same, lowered, or eliminated? (ANES) 
i. Raised  
ii. Kept the same  
iii. Lowered  
iv. Eliminated  
c. Q26: Do you favor an increase, decrease, or no change in government 
spending to provide health insurance to those who do not have it? (modified 
ANES) 
i. Greatly increase  
ii. Slightly increase  
iii. No change  
iv. Slightly decrease  
v. Greatly decrease  
d. Q28: Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying 
to reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and the poorest 
households? (ANES) 
i. Strongly favor  
ii. Slightly favor  
iii. Neither favor nor oppose  
iv. Slightly oppose  
v. Strongly oppose  
e. Q30: Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing universities 
to increase the number of black students studying at their school by 
considering race along with other factors when choosing students? (ANES) 
i. Strongly favor  
ii. Slightly favor  
iii. Neither favor nor oppose  
iv. Slightly oppose  
v. Strongly oppose  
9. Policy Index Block, Part 2 
a. Q58: Should federal spending on aid to the poor be increased, decreased, or 
kept the same? (ANES) 
i. Greatly increase federal spending on aid to the poor 
ii. Slightly increase federal spending on aid to the poor 
iii. Kept the same 
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iv. Slightly decrease federal spending on aid to the poor 
v. Greatly decrease federal spending on aid to the poor 
b. Q33: Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose requiring employers 
to offer paid leave to parents of new children? (ANES) 
i. Strongly favor paid parental leave  
ii. Slightly favor paid parental leave 
iii. Neither favor nor oppose paid parental leave 
iv. Slightly oppose paid parental leave 
v. Strongly oppose paid parental leave 
c. Q35: Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should 
be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? (ANES) 
i. Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their 
home country  
ii. Have a guest worker program in order to work  
iii. Allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they 
meet certain requirements.  
iv. Allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship without 
penalties.  
d. Q31: Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or 
kept the same? (ANES) 
i. Greatly increase federal spending on welfare programs  
ii. Slightly increase federal spending on welfare programs  
iii. Kept the same  
iv. Slightly decrease federal spending on welfare programs  
v. Greatly decrease federal spending on welfare programs  
10. Demographic Block  
a. The final section of this survey deals with demographic questions. Please 
select the answer choice that most accurately describes yourself. Again, all 
answers are kept confidential.  
b. Q39: With which of the following racial/ethnic categories do you primarily 
identify with (Check all that apply rather than single option) (Newmark) 
i. White  
ii. Black of African American  
iii. American Indian or Alaska Native  
iv. Asian  
v. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
vi. Other (open response)  
c. Q41: With which gender do you primarily identify with? (Newmark) 
i. Man  
ii. Woman  
iii. Not listed above (Please specify) (Open response)  
iv. Prefer not to say  
d. Q43: Ideologically speaking, where would you place yourself ranging from 
extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right)? (Newmark) 
i. Slider scale 1-7, 1= extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative  
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e. Q45: Generally speaking, regardless of how you voted in the last election, do 
you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent? 
(ANES) 
i. Republican  
ii. Democrat  
iii. Independent  
f. Q60: (If responded Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong or not very 
strong Democrat? (ANES) 
i. Strong Democrat  
ii. Not very strong Democrat  
g. Q61: (If responded Republican) Would you call yourself a strong or not very 
strong Republican? (ANES) 
i. Strong Republican  
ii. Not very strong Republican  
h. Q62: (If responded independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican or Democratic Party? (ANES) 
i. Closer to the Republican Party  
ii. Neither  
iii. Closer to the Democratic Party 
i. Q44: What is your year of birth? (Qualtrics standard demographic question) 
i. (Open response)  
11. Closing message: ​Thank you for completing the main portion of the survey. If you are 
completing this survey for extra credit, please follow the link below. Please fill out 
the information for your professor to be notified that you completed the survey. 
Thank you so much for your valuable time and effort in participating in this survey. 
Extra Credit Form.  
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